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If you want a difficult research task, try to find staunch defenders of
existing residential mortgage foreclosure law in the legal scholarship of
recent decades. There aren't many.1 For years, the literature featured
* George R. Ward Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Faculty
Fellow, UNC Center for Urban and Regional Studies, and Visiting Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law
School 2009-2010. Thanks to Mark Scarberry for inviting me to the Pepperdine Law Review
symposium on the mortgage crisis in April 2009 that led to this piece, and to David Reiss for helpful
comments on an earlier draft. Jabeen Ahmad, John Fitzpatrick, and Justin Wong offered substantial
research assistance and Nick Sexton offered valuable library assistance.
1. A possible exception is Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Critiquing the Foreclosure Process: An
Economic Approach Based on the Paradigmatic Norms of Bankruptcy, 79 VA. L. REv. 959, 962
(1993), who argued that the system is not necessarily flawed merely because it produced below-
market auction prices. However, Johnson's article did not suggest that the process is problem-free,
and offered suggestions for reform. See generally id. In the early 1990s, Michael Schill defended
the system against charges of inefficiency, but nonetheless observed other problems with sale prices.
Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489, 538
(1991) ("[O]ther government interventions, such as mortgagor protection laws, may promote
economic efficiency in ways that are not immediately apparent, nor easily provable.").
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complaints about the delay and expense inherent in state foreclosure laws
and their impact on mortgage markets.2 It also included concerns that
foreclosure sales often fail to produce fair market value, leading borrowers
to forfeit equity and to face deficiency judgments.
As correctives, real estate scholars traditionally proposed doctrinal and
procedural changes to alter the details of the foreclosure process: their
suggestions would have made the process longer or shorter, harder or easier,
more judicial or less, federally preempted or uniform. The goals reflected
in these proposals were often sensible and laudable. But, as Prentiss Cox
has recently observed, these goals and proposals tread on fairly limited
ground.'
The recent spike in foreclosure filings spawned many proposals
premised on very different goals from the traditional law review scholarship.
Saving homes became expressly more important and drove various efforts to
incentivize private loan modification. However, other proposals sought to
save homes without necessarily saving homeownership. For example, the
economist Dean Baker proposed a "right to rent."6 Under this plan, some
homeowners would retain a possessory right to their homes as renters after
completion of foreclosure.7 Other authors have offered similar rent or lease-
back ideas.'
2. See, e.g., William C. Prather, A Realistic Approach to Foreclosure, 14 BUS. LAW. 132, 132
(1958) (citing non-uniform "chaotic" foreclosure laws as the "largest single deterrent to the free flow
of mortgage money"); Committee on Mortgage Law and Practice, Cost and Time Factors in
Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 413, 413 (1968) (noting a "great deal of
criticism" of foreclosure laws and their impact on mortgage credit).
3. For a discussion of the concern expressed in legal literature regarding delinquent borrowers,
see infra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Part II.
5. Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public Purpose
Approach, 45 HOuS. L. REv. 683, 720 (2008) ("The focus of much of legal scholarship on the
adequacy of foreclosure sale procedures has led to a formalistic debate of limited relevance in
practice.").
6. Dean Baker, Subprime Borrowers Deserve an Own to Rent Transition, ECONOMISTs' VOICE,
Feb. 2008, at 2-3, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol5/issl/art5.
7. Id. This article does not address the constitutionality of this kind of proposal. For some
discussion elsewhere, see Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A
Reappraisal, 51 ALA. L. REv. 977, 979 n. 13 (2000) (noting that under the Contracts Clause, courts
upheld "[d]epression-era mortgage foreclosure moratoria by reading the sovereign's emergency
powers into contracts as a postulate of the legal order" (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435 (1934) (quotation omitted))); Blake D. Morant, The Teachings of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Contract Theory: An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REv. 63, 90
n.151 (1998) (noting that "the Court upheld the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act as a
reasonable exercise of state powers during an emergency and rejected the argument that the act
impaired the obligation of a private contract within the meaning of the Contract Clause." (citing
Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934))).
8. Daniel Alpert, Op-Ed, Why Own when You Can Lease?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2009, at A17
(proposing that lenders accept deeds in lieu of foreclosure and lease properties to former owners who
would have the option to repurchase the home in five years at fair market value).
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One need not favor a right to rent to recognize how it refocuses the
values of foreclosure law reform. Far more so than the traditional
foreclosure reform law review literature, the right to rent addresses discrete
housing policy concerns like shelter, involuntary dislocation on residents
with special needs such as school-age children, and externalities beyond
preservation of a robust mortgage market.9
Furthermore, a proposal premised on conversion to leasehold rights
separates the concept of saving homes from saving homeownership.'o The
proposal thus usefully challenges the assumption that ownership is essential
or optimal to achieving certain housing objectives.
Part II of this Article identifies the themes of the traditional foreclosure
law review scholarship." Part III discusses the right to rent proposal in the
context of the three examples of values noted above.12 Part IV emphasizes
the utility of disaggregating ownership from these values. 3 Part V
concludes. 14
II. TRADITIONAL FORECLOSURE LAW SCHOLARSHIP: A ZooM LENS ON
DEBT ENFORCEMENT'5
Foreclosure on the mortgage of a principal residence is, in its most
direct sense, private contract enforcement that divests the household of its
ownership interest.' 6 Two sets of complaints about this process appeared to
motivate traditional law review scholarship on residential mortgage
foreclosure. The first set was usually framed in terms of efficiency."
9. See Baker, supra note 6, at 2-3.
10. See id.
11. See infra notes 15-41 and accompanying text. I use the term "traditional" to refer to the last
several decades of foreclosure law scholarship preceding the mortgage crisis produced by real estate
scholars.
12. See infra notes 42-73 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
15. Jabeen Ahmad contributed substantially to the production of this section of the article.
16. See, e.g., James B. Hughes, Jr., Taking Personal Responsibility: A Different View of
Mortgage Anti-Deficiency and Redemption Statutes, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 117, 122-23 (1997). For an
analysis of the shift from a property to contract paradigm over time, see Frank S. Alexander,
Mortgage Prepayment: The Trial of Common Sense, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 288 (1987).
17. See, e.g., James Geoffrey Durham, In Defense of Strict Foreclosure: A Legal and Economic
Analysis of Mortgage Foreclosure, 36 S.C. L. REv. 461, 463-64 (1985) ("Mortgage foreclosures are
part of an economic transaction. As such, mortgage foreclosures should and can be analyzed as
economic transactions. Efficiency should be the primary goal in devising a mortgage foreclosure
process because, in a broad sense, efficiency benefits all parties to the mortgage foreclosure
process."); see also id at 504 ("Current mortgage law is inefficient."). Prentiss Cox recently
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Writers expressed concern about the time and expense of the process for
lenders, particularly if judicial foreclosure was required," and questioned
the utility of substantive mortgagor protections such as redemption rights
and prohibitions on deficiency judgments.19 As the argument often went, the
expense and delay associated with longer and more debtor-protective
foreclosure processes decreased the attractiveness of investing in mortgage-
backed securities on the secondary market and affected the cost of and
access to mortgage credit for future borrowers.2 o Like many articles in the
real estate finance literature,21 law review articles commonly suggested that
observed the dominance of this framework across authors in this field. See Cox, supra note 5, at
717.
18. See, e.g., John Mixon & Ira B. Shepard, Antideficiency Relieffor Foreclosed Homeowners:
ULSIA Section 511(b), 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 455, 477-79 (1992) (arguing that the goal of
foreclosure is to liquidate the lender's interest as quickly as possible when the borrower has no
possibility of curing the mortgage, and yet noting that foreclosure remains a "time-consuming,
complex undertaking"); see also Durham, supra note 17, at 477; Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., The
Future of American Real Estate Law: Uniform Foreclosure Laws and Uniform Land Security
Interest Act, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1109, 1119-20 (1996) [hereinafter Randolph, Uniform Foreclosure
Laws] ("[The] cost of judicial foreclosure is far out of proportion to the number of borrowers truly
protected from unfair or overreaching foreclosure practices."); Debra Pogrund Stark, Foreclosing on
the American Dream: An Evaluation of State and Federal Foreclosure Laws, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 229,
232 (1998).
19. See generally Schill, supra note 1. See also Durham, supra note 17, at 472 (finding that
reinstatement statutes "may result in inefficiency"); id. at 484-86 (critiquing anti-deficiency laws
and post-sale redemption rights on efficiency grounds); Hughes, supra note 16, at 120, 124
(discussing mortgagor protection devices that can "relieve the mortgagor of the obligation to fulfill
certain of its promises to the mortgagee" and categorizing statutes that prohibit deficiency
judgments); Mixon & Shepard, supra note 18, at 455; Marshall E. Tracht, Renegotiation and
Secured Credit: Explaining the Equity of Redemption, 52 VAND. L. REV. 599 (1999). Some writers
conceptualize mortgagor protection laws as compulsory insurance in a situation in which individuals
tend to under-insure privately. See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Debtor Protection
Rules in Subprime Market Default Situations, in BUILDING ASSETS, BUILDING CREDIT: CREATING
WEALTH IN Low-INCOME COMMUNITIES 266, 279 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2005)
("From the point of view of the borrower, debtor protection rules function as insurance against the
adverse consequences of default."); Schill, supra note 1, at 591.
20. Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and Efficiency of
Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 652 (1997) [hereinafter
Stark, Facing the Facts]; see also Mixon & Shepard, supra note 18, at 477-79 (1992) (observing
that judicial foreclosure and statutory redemption heightened expenses for lenders and increased
mortgage credit prices for future borrowers); Randolph, Uniform Foreclosure Laws, supra note 18,
at Il I1 (noting that lenders are more likely to lend when they can "readily predict the performance
of their investment" and that foreclosure laws are a "significant impediment to making those
predictions").
21. See, e.g., Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit, 88
REv. ECON. & STAT. 177, 180 (2006) (estimating that loan sizes are smaller in judicial foreclosure
states and concluding that this reflects reduced supply of credit). See also Terrence M. Clauretie,
State Foreclosure Laws, Risk Shifting, and the Private Mortgage Insurance Industry, 56 J. RISK &
INs. 544, 552 (1989) (concluding that judicial foreclosure, statutory right of redemption, and anti-
deficiency statutes add significantly to mortgage risk, and also citing a 1975 study finding large
differences between loan losses and the presence of mortgagor protection features); Terrence M.
Clauretie & Thomas Herzog, The Effect of State Foreclosure Laws on Loan Losses: Evidence from
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mortgagor protection did in fact affect mortgage credit cost and access, with
commentators making various judgments about the size of the burdens and
whether the benefits outweighed them. 22
Proposals to respond to these types of concerns included shortening the
foreclosure process, removing substantive protections for defaulting
borrowers (e.g., anti-deficiency laws, rights to redemption), and encouraging
more jurisdictions to adopt power of sale or other, faster non-judicial
procedures.23 To the extent that a lack of uniformity in foreclosure law from
state to state24 also burdened mortgage markets,25 writers also proposed
reducing or eliminating non-uniformity in residential mortgage law,
the Mortgage Insurance Industry, 22 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 221, 231 (1990) (predicting
borrowers in more protective states eventually will pay higher private mortgage insurance
premiums); Charles M. Kahn & Abdullah Yava§, The Economic Role of Foreclosures, 8 J. REAL
EST. FIN. & EcoN. 35, 46 (1994) (mortgagor protection laws have substantial effects on market);
Richard A. Phillips & James H. Vanderoff, The Conditional Probability of Foreclosure: An
Empirical Analysis of Conventional Mortgage Loan Defaults, 32 REAL EST. EcON. 571, 584 (2004)
(less protective laws will reduce costs and will lower mortgage interest rates).
22. See, e.g., Patrick B. Bauer, Judicial Foreclosure and Statutory Redemption: The Soundness
of Iowa's Traditional Preference for Protection over Credit, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6, 75 (1985)
(observing that "critics of judicial foreclosure and statutory redemption commonly contend that both
generate costs that greatly outweigh their actual benefits" but reaching an opposite conclusion);
Schill, supra note 1, at 491 (finding that interest rates were relatively insensitive to the presence of
mortgagor protection and offering justifications for mortgagor protections).
23. See Cox, supra note 5, at 700 (discussing proposals for power of sale or foreclosure by
appraisal); Durham, supra note 17 (arguing that strict foreclosure is the most economic efficient
method for foreclosure); Basil H. Mattingly, The Shift from Power to Process: A Functional
Approach to Foreclosure Law, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 77, 114-20 (1996) (arguing for strict foreclosure
when borrowers or other lien holders fail to object); Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming
Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1444-46 (2004)
(discussing foreclosure by appraisal); Schill, supra note 1, at 535 (proposing a compulsory
foreclosure insurance program as substitute for substantive mortgagor protections).
24. Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and Federal
Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293, 295 (1993) [hereinafter Alexander, Federal Intervention] ("No
two states have identical mortgage laws.").
25. See Mixon & Shepard, supra note 18, at 482 ("Uniformity is essential for efficient secondary
market operation [because it allows investors] to assess portfolio values on a rate-of-return basis
without worrying about jurisdictional differences. . . ."); Nelson & Whitman, supra note 23 (citing
changes in the mortgage market as a factor favoring uniformity in foreclosure law); Randolph,
Uniform Foreclosure Laws, supra note 18, at 1111 (noting that mortgage market investors were
"national and international sources unrelated to the location of the project" and were "more likely to
lend it if they can readily predict the performance of their investment," but also justifying uniform
foreclosure law on other grounds, including fairness and secure and predictable title); Patrick A.
Randolph, Jr., The New Federal Foreclosure Laws, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 123 (1996) [hereinafter
Randolph, New Federal Foreclosure Laws] (suggesting that states should create their own
foreclosure laws). For a general discussion of the broader pressures toward national uniformity and
federalization in real estate law, see generally Alexander, Federal Intervention, supra note 24, at
295.
515
although they disagreed on the desirability of federal preemption in the event
that uniform state foreclosure law projects continued to fail. 26
Defenders of debtor-protective features of foreclosure law and longer
timelines sometimes justified their positions on preserving
homeownership. 27 Nonetheless, writers frequently assumed that a forced
sale was inevitable and focused primarily on addressing below-market-value
auction prices. 28 Writers sometimes tied concerns about low sale prices to
efficiency, but also questioned fairness.29 Specifically, they worried that
borrowers forfeited equity or faced deficiency judgments (were state law to
permit) because of depressed foreclosure sale prices.30  Although lenders
were affected when lower sale prices did not cover their debt,31 their greater
ability to successfully credit bid their debt in the auction and later re-sell for
fair market value (albeit with additional transaction costs) offered lenders
more protection than the debtors losing their homes.3 2
26. Compare Nelson & Whitman, supra note 23, at 1512-13 (suggesting federal legislation for
pragmatic reasons), with Randolph, Uniform Foreclosure Laws, supra note 18, at 1120-25, 1128
(concluding that "federally preemptive foreclosure laws are not the answer" and that state
legislatures are in the best position to evaluate how to integrate a roughly uniform law into its own
state's existing situation), and Randolph, New Federal Foreclosure Laws, supra note 25, at 134
(calling federal preemption foreclosure statute a "blunderbuss" and suggesting that the states should
decide on their own foreclosure laws), and Alexander, Federal Intervention, supra note 24 (urging
caution to those pursuing federal preemption).
27. See, e.g., Patrick B. Bauer, Statutory Redemption Reconsidered: The Operation of Iowa's
Redemption Statute in Two Counties Between 1881 and 1980, 70 IOwA L. REV. 343 (1985); Stark,
Facing the Facts, supra note 20, at 657 (noting the perceived benefit of a longer timeline for the
homeowners who might be able to reinstate mortgage or redeem home). Schill has also justified
protections on the ex ante insurance benefits even if they are rarely used. Schill, supra note 1, at
591.
28. Bauer, supra note 27, at 344-45; Mattingly, supra note 23, at 95 ("By their historical nature,
foreclosure sales are not designed to produce the best possible price for the property. A good price
at a foreclosure sale is an accident."); Robert M. Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response
to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 843 (1980) ("The
inadequate price problem ... is acute in certain real estate markets and under certain financial
conditions[,] and will remain a problem due to structural deficiencies in the foreclosure process that
prevent the mortgagor from receiving an adequate price for his property.").
29. Examples of articles expressing this viewpoint were written by Basil Mattingly, Debra Stark,
James Geoffrey Durham, Dale Whitman, and Grant Nelson. See, e.g., Mattingly, supra note 23;
Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note 20.
30. Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note 20, at 645 ("[If the amount bid is less than the final
judgment, the lender sometimes seeks a deficiency judgment against the borrower following
confirmation of the judicial sale . . . .").
31. See, e.g, Durham, supra note 17, at 509-10 (arguing for mortgage enforcers' entitlement to
full recovery independent of property value and arguing against anti-deficiency statutes).
32. Stark, Facing the Facts, supra note 20, at 665 ("The main criticism of the foreclosure process
is that the lender obtains an unfair double recovery by bidding less than the debt due to her, bringing
a deficiency action against the borrower, and then reselling the property within one year for more
than she bid."). Stark found this was rare in her dataset from Cook County, Illinois. Id Yet the
successful third-party bidders tended to be buyers with substantial experience in foreclosure sales
who were seeking a bargain. Id. at 677 (referring to "third party scavengers"). For a general
discussion of the debate and earlier sources, see generally Nelson & Whitman, supra note 23 and
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Factors blamed for depressing foreclosure sale prices included lack of
information about the property, and the possibility of redemption.33
Proposals that responded to concerns about sale prices included requiring
property appraisals,34 appointing trustees to make equity determinations and
ensure price maximization, conducting "commercially reasonable" private
sales or negotiating sales so that they are more market-mimicking,
requiring disgorgement of surplus from lenders' future re-sales,3  and
limiting or eliminating mortgagor protections that decreased the finality of
foreclosure sales and thus may depress sales prices.38
On the whole, the traditional legal real estate literature articulated the
values at stake in foreclosure reform as the right to an expeditious collection
process for the mortgagee (with benefits for future borrowers in the form of
more access to mortgage credit), and the preservation of the economic value
of home equity for the borrower through fair market sale prices, with some
writers seeking ways to balance these interests. 39
While analyses varied, they generally stemmed from the doctrinal
conception of foreclosure as enforcement of debtor-creditor contracts, and
Mattingly, supra note 23, at 100.
33. See, e.g., Nelson & Whitman, supra note 23, at 1418-24 (explaining the connotation of
public auction of real property as a "distress sale" and then reviewing the features of real estate
foreclosure sales that make it harder for third party bidders to, inter alia, arrange financing or learn
about the property); see also Mattingly, supra note 23.
34. Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict
Foreclosure-An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 850, 894-95 (1985) ("To protect the interests of mortgagors ... a statute could empower the
court to require an independent appraisal of the current retail market value of the property."); Stark,
Facing the Facts, supra note 20, at 686-88 (proposing bifurcated strict foreclosure/judicial
foreclosure based on results of appraisal).
35. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 981 (also attributing the trustee concept to Nelson and
Whitman).
36. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 23, at 1440-45 (recommending negotiated sales and
foreclosure by appraisals as set forth in Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act); see also Stark,
Facing the Facts, supra note 20, at 686-87; Mattingly, supra note 23, at 114-20 (discussing ways to
promote competitive bidding).
37. Wechsler, supra note 34, at 887-89.
38. But see Bauer, supra note 22, at 74-75 (arguing that statutory redemption reduces the
problem of price inadequacy).
39. Id. at 13 (discussing standard tension between protection and credit availability); see also
Mattingly, supra note 23, at 81, 133 (concluding that balancing efficiency for lenders with fairness
for borrowers entails a system that puts upward pressure on foreclosure bid prices); Stark, supra note
18, at 236 (describing how a fair system balances the interests of lenders and non-defaulting
borrowers in a fast and inexpensive system with the interests of defaulting borrowers in having
opportunities to be heard and in maintaining equity); Wechsler, supra note 34, at 884 (discussing
"objectives of providing competitive bidding and fair prices, while preserving mortgagees' rights to
collect deficiencies") (footnote omitted).
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the perceived importance of well-functioning debt enforcement to mortgage
markets.4 0  The consequent cost-benefit analysis in which many authors
engaged was expressly and intentionally limited.4 1
III. FORECLOSURE LAW REFORM THROUGH A WIDE-ANGLE LENS
Rising subprime mortgage foreclosure rates prompted newer
contributions that expressly called for a broader range of objectives to shape
foreclosure law reform.42  These writings questioned whether changing the
mechanics of the foreclosure process would be sufficient to reflect the goals
of housing policy writ large.
As foreclosure initiation rates rose more generally, housing experts and
academics proposed temporary changes to foreclosure law that also departed
from the premises of the traditional scholarship reviewed in Part II.43 For
example, Martin Feldstein proposed that, at the borrower's option,
underwater mortgages be written down to 120% of the value of the
collateral, but that the borrower must commit to full personal liability for the
loan and could not discharge that liability in a federal bankruptcy case.44
40. See Anthony B. Sanders, Barriers to Homeownership and Housing Quality: The Impact of
the International Mortgage Market, 14 J. HOUSING ECON. 147, 151-52 (2005). Sanders has set forth
a nonexclusive taxonomy of factors that influence the development of mortgage market in any given
country, including: "(1) legal systems that delay foreclosure proceedings, (2) incomplete or weak
financial institutions, (3) high inflation, and (4) cultural barriers to mortgage market development
and homeownership." Id
41. For example, the analysis tends not to include benefits (or costs) to which it is difficult to
assign a numerical value, whose numerical value is not consistent, or whose numerical value cannot
be determined. See LORNA FOX, CONCEPTUALISING HOME: THEORIES, LAWS AND POLICIES 436
(2007) [hereinafter Fox, CONCEPTUALISING HOME] (identifying values that are not easily quantified
and thus usually not weighed against creditors' quantifiable interests); Lorna Fox, Re-Possessing
"Home": A Re-Analysis of Gender, Homeownership and Debtor Default for Feminist Legal Theory,
14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 423, 444 (2008) [hereinafter Fox, Re-Possessing "Home"] ("The
meanings associated with home and homeownership include both the readily identifiable,
measurable, and easily recognizable ideas of financial investment in the property and the physical
structure of the home, as well as the social, psychological, emotional and cultural meanings
associated with home, which are intangible and immeasurable, and so have tended to be more
problematic for lawyers.").
42. The foreclosure crisis has generated many articles discussing foreclosure reform, but two
recent examples that expressly make the point about reform reflecting goals other than those in the
traditional scholarship are Cox, supra note 5, at 686, 717, and Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership
Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role of Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2261
(2008) [hereinafter Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk]. Prentiss Cox argues that "state foreclosure laws
should be evaluated by their impact on desired social outcomes for housing" and that "[n]ational
housing policy goals, however construed, should drive foreclosure law reform." Cox, supra note 5,
at 723, 745. Cox identifies "high levels of homeownership" and "community stability and housing
quality" as the guiding principles for foreclosure reform. Id. at 723. The proposals he advances stay
within the general parameters of adjusting the foreclosure process. Id. at 739-41 (proposing longer
timelines and better information about rights to object and to save one's home).
43. See supra notes 15-41 and accompanying text.
44. Martin Feldstein, How to Save an 'Underwater' Mortgage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2009, at
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Full and non-dischargeable personal liability means that other non-
homestead property could be repossessed for unpaid mortgage amounts.
In Dean Baker's proposed right to rent, a completed foreclosure would
not necessarily result in ejection of the former homeowner.4 5 Instead, the
former homeowner could remain in the home if she could pay the fair
market rent.46 Especially during the housing crisis, the fair market rent was
supposed to be more affordable than homeowners' prior mortgage payments
in at least some areas, increasing the feasibility of this proposal.47 For a set
time period, residents' leasehold rights would survive subsequent sales of
the property.48
The right to rent and similar leaseback proposals were cast as temporary
changes in foreclosure laws in response to a crisis.49 Although efforts to
contain crises raise different issues than those raised by ordinary
lawmaking,50 the right to rent or leaseback idea reframes the values of
foreclosure law in ways that are useful for permanent foreclosure reform
discussions. Three examples follow.
A. Shelter
As a pragmatic starting point, a right to rent proposal resolves the
question of whether a former homeowner will have a place to live. To the
extent the government intervenes in housing at all, shelter seems like a fairly
fundamental objective. Yet, the traditional law review scholarship generally
did not discuss how existing foreclosure law addressed shelter concerns or
how the law could be reformed to deal with such problems.5 '
A13.
45. See Baker, supra note 6.
46. Id. See also The Science of Insolvency: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Dean
Baker, Co-Dir. For the Ctr. for Econ. and Pol'y Research).
47. See id.
48. See id
49. See id, supra note 6; see also Alpert, supra note 8, for his proposal to have lenders accept
deeds in lieu of foreclosure and then lease properties to former owners.
50. See generally Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CoNN. L. REv. 1051, 1051
(2009) (arguing that financial crisis containment decisions made by the government are brief,
predictable, and costly, and that mapping containment efforts will help reshape crisis policy debates
and "make crisis response more transparent and accountable").
51. As previously reviewed, these scholars considered some legal issues that take place after the
auction of a foreclosed home, such as whether the lender can pursue a deficiency judgment and if the
debtor has post-sale statutory redemption rights. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text.
Some scholars in the United Kingdom and Israel have expressly incorporated shelter concerns into
discussions of foreclosure law. See, e.g., Janet Ford et al., Widening the Mortgage Safety Net: Some
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Perhaps scholars thought that shelter would not be a problem for
families who lose their homes to foreclosure.52 Presumably, such
assumptions flowed from the overall demography of the homeless. That
assumption should be reconsidered. Recently, advocacy organizations and
the news media have recognized that at least temporary homelessness flows
from foreclosure for some families.54 After all, families who have just gone
through foreclosure tend to have both limited means and a damaged credit
rating, both of which hamper access to quality rental housing."
Questions of Effectiveness, 12 BENEFITS 95 (2004) (discussing the United Kingdom); Avital
Margalit, The Value of Home Ownership, 7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 467 (2006) (discussing home
ownership in Israel). Of course, scholars sometimes work within legal regimes that already reflect
shelter concerns such as laws conditioning foreclosure completion on whether a delinquent
homeowner has secured reasonable living accommodations, or laws granting judges discretion to
consider a variety of factors when scheduling a sale. See, e.g., id. at 482 (discussing a mortgagor's
right to shelter due to Israel's Tenant Protection Law). However, as Margalit notes, advance waivers
erode this principle to some extent. Id at 483. See also Fox, CONCEPTUALISING HOME, supra note
41, at 79-130 (discussing laws in Britain that give judges discretion to consider, inter alia, a menu of
factors even though most judges primarily consider the lenders' position).
52. For a recent observation, see, e.g., Rachel D. Godsil & David V. Simunovich, Protecting
Status: The Mortgage Crisis, Eminent Domain, and the Ethic of Homeownership, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 949, 985 (2008) ("The mortgage crisis has not generally been viewed as likely to lead to a rash
of homelessness-rather, it has raised the specter of people losing homes they purchased. In other
words, most who are concerned about the mortgage foreclosure debacle recognize that homeowner
status is at issue.").
53. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Homelessness as a Property Problem, 36 URB. LAW. 273, 282-83(2004) (reporting on research finding that homeless are largely drawn from the very impoverished).
Kim Hopper and Jill Hamberg have more broadly discussed temporary displacement from housing.
Kim Hopper & Jill Hamberg, The Making of America's Homeless: From Skid Row to New Poor,
1945-1984, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 12-13 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986).
Hopper and Hamberg conclude that "the threat of homelessness . .. is not limited to the already
disenfranchised or marginally situated." Id. at 37; see also A. R. Veness, Home and Homelessness
in the United States: Changing Ideals and Realities, 10 ENV'T & PLAN. D: SoC'Y & SPACE 445, 445(1992) (discussing less visible and more contested examples of homelessness). Moreover, laws and
norms in the United States make it harder to combine multiple families into a single dwelling or
hinder nontraditional housing options. Frank S. Alexander, The Housing of America's Families:
Control, Exclusion, and Privilege, 54 EMORY L. J. 1231 (2005); Stephanie M. Stem, Residential
Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1130-31 (2009) (noting
that lack of legal protection for and outright prohibition of some dwellings that residents identify as
homes calls into question earnest policy interest in "residential stability as a psychological
requisite.").
54. FORECLOSURE TO HOMELESSNESS 2009: THE FORGOTTEN VICTIMS OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS
5 (2009), www.nationalhomeless.org/advocacy/ForeclosuretoHomelessness06O9.pdf; Peter S.
Goodman, Foreclosures Force Ex-Homeowners to Turn to Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009, at
Al (discussing reports of homelessness of foreclosure defendants, including former homeowner who
slept in car, stayed with various friends and family for over a year, and then checked into homeless
shelter); Jonathan D. Glater, Another Hurdle for the Jobless: Credit Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,2009, at Al (discussing a man who lost his house to foreclosure, filed for bankruptcy, and lived in a
homeless shelter while looking for new employment). More readily recognized is the possibility
that foreclosures create shelter risk for renter-occupiers. See, e.g., THE NAT'L LAW CTR. ON
HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY & THE NAT'L COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, HOMES, NOT
HANDCUFFS: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 8, 14 (2009).
55. For examples of media coverage of these circumstances, see Dinah Eng, Renters Again, but
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Ultimately, a right to rent may not be the right temporary or permanent
policy response. But the proposal reminds us that shelter should be a part of
the foreclosure law reform conversation.s6
B. Residents With Special Needs: The Example of Children
Forced exit from homeownership poses challenges for households
comprised of members at various stages of the life cycle or with special
needs. Families with school-aged children are a common example.57 The
most visible issue is the potential disruption to education, particularly if
children are enrolled in local public schools.5 According to Loma Fox,
writing about the United Kingdom, some children experience anguish and
fears about their uncertain future in anticipation of foreclosure.59 Even if
with an Asterisk; A Foreclosure Damages Credit. But Landlords May Ease the Way for Some Who
Lost Homes, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at KI ("The good news is that there are plenty of rentals
available. The bad news is that a foreclosure taints a credit record, making it harder to rent a
place.... A common mistake people facing foreclosure make, he said, is trying to hold onto the
house as long as possible by maxing out credit cards and not making car payments. Such actions
damage credit ratings even more."); id. ("Typically, foreclosures are viewed as negatively as an
eviction is in our industry," Sans said. "As we evaluate things, it's possible we may change our
rental criteria to accommodate renters in this situation."); see also Conor Dougherty, In the Boonies,
the American Dream Is Up for Rent, WALL ST. J., March 30, 2009, at Al8 (reporting on the growth
of the home rental market at the suburban fringe due to single-family home owners who have been
forced to break their homes into rental units); Motoko Rich, TURF; A Blacklist for Renters, N.Y.
TIMES, April 8, 2004, at Fl (discussing the impact of past allegations of housing defaults on ability
to rent elsewhere).
56. For a discussion of whether there should be a right to housing, see Kristen David Adams, Do
We Need a Right to Housing?, 9 NEV. L.J. 275 (2009).
57. Still, "[v]oting-age adults who currently have no children in the public-school pipeline form a
majority in most jurisdictions." WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES
148 (2001).
58. See FOX, CONCEPTUALISING HOME, supra note 41, at 441 ("[R]esearch has indicated that the
effects of mortgage arrears and the threat of repossession begin to take their toll on children long
before the children actually become homeless."). The McKinney-Vento Homeless Education
Assistance Improvements Act of 2001, 42 USCS § 11431 (2009), provides for education needs of
"homeless children." This law is designed to give homeless children the ability to remain in a school
even as they move between temporary residences that straddle school districts, but school districts
determine the district based on best interest of the child. Homeless children is defined in 42 U.S.C.
§ I1434a(2) to mean "individuals who lack a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence
(within the meaning of section II 302(a)(1) of this title)," and includes sharing homes due to loss of
housing. See generally Erik Eckholm, Surge in Homeless Children Strains School Districts, N.Y.




they readily recover from the experience,60 financially distressed parents'
fears of the impact of foreclosure on their children drive them to hold onto
homeownership longer than they reasonably should.'
Even though homeownership is often touted for its benefits to children,
the traditional foreclosure law scholarship in the United States rarely
addressed children in an explicit way. Writing more recently about the
United Kingdom, Loma Fox gave considerable treatment to the question of
children and foreclosure in her book, Conceptualising Home. The book
observed the stark contrast between the attempt to incorporate children's
needs and best interests into some legal doctrines, such as in family law, and
the relative absence of such concerns in the law governing the termination of
homeownership. Fox noted that most U.K. courts did not take children's
school or other interests into account.63
Fox's book highlighted one example of a judge postponing a foreclosure
sale until the youngest child in the home reached the age of majority.6" The
court determined that the lender would not be unduly prejudiced by the
delay. 65 The court also noted the mother's difficulties in finding a suitable
alternative residence given that the value of her current home was on the low
end of housing values in the area. Fox ultimately concluded that the
"collective" interests of child-occupiers-as opposed to the interests of the
specific children at issue-should be taken more expressly into account in
the foreclosure process.
60. Stephanie Stem reports that children adjust fairly quickly after forced relocation. Stem,
supra, note 53, at 1117-18. But it is not clear that her cited examples arise from foreclosure as
opposed to other types of forced relocation (such as eminent domain) that carry different
connotations. Stem also suggests that the children who are at risk due to the negative effects of
excessive mobility tend not to be the children who benefit from home-protective legislation. Id. at
1118. Presumably this has become less true due to the expansion of highly-leveraged
homeownership to more economically marginalized families.
61. Fox, CONCEPTUALISING HOME, supra note 41, at 445 (noting that people cling to homes
they cannot afford rather than downward-adjusting because of their children and because they know
they will not qualify for another home loan); KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, FALLING FROM GRACE: THE
EXPERIENCE OF DOWNWARD MOBILITY IN THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS 224-25 (1988) (noting
that many divorced mothers cling to the old family home "in an effort to provide their children with
as much social continuity as possible, believing they need[] to protect their kids from any more
disruption than they ha[ve] already faced as a result of divorce"); Hazel Christie, Mortgage Arrears
and Gender Inequalities, 15 HOUSING STUDIES 877, 896 (2000) (discussing how households with
children were more likely to be reluctant to move); Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN.
L. REv. 1003, 1023 (2002) (discussing the complex financial factors families with children must
weigh when considering the decision to move).
62. Fox, CONCEPTUALISING HOME, supra note 41, at 411-12, 419 (2007).
63. Id. at 416.
64. Id. at 417. Even though most U.K. courts primarily consider the financial claim of the
lender, the applicable laws make the welfare of child-occupants a permissible factor. Id. at 427, 430.
65. Id at 433 (discussing the judge's finding that the lender had an equity cushion).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 437.
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By comparison, Baker's right to rent proposal gives parents more
control over the timing of a geographical transition without forestalling the
lender's foreclosure of the ownership interest.68 Although the proposal was
meant as only an emergency intervention, it should stimulate consideration
of whether foreclosure law or related laws could better reflect the needs of
children or other residents with special needs.
C. Externalities
The traditional foreclosure law reform scholarship focused primarily on
one externality: the impact of foreclosure law on the market for residential
mortgages. By contrast, Baker's right to rent proposal seems to be driven by
a far wider array of third-party effects of foreclosure and foreclosure law.
0
Examples include foreclosure's impact on neighbors' property values,
neighborhoods that become more unkempt and unsafe, and declines in local
governments' tax revenues contemporaneous with a need to expend money
to address the problem of abandoned homes.71 Baker's proposal is of a piece
with other recent scholarship discussing ways to combat this fallout from
widespread mortgage default.72  Presumably, Baker's approach could be
targeted towards neighborhoods that are subject to a particularized risk of
severe decline due to the concentration of delinquent mortgages.73  More
generally, though, the right to rent illustrates the wider array of third-party
effects that could be taken into account in permanent foreclosure law reform
beyond that of the mortgage market impact.
68. Id
69. Baker, supra note 6, at 2-3. For example, students might be permitted to remain at their
public school even though they no longer reside in the district. For a discussion of the law
promoting school stability for homeless children, see supra note 58.
70. See Baker, supra note 6.
71. Cox, supra note 5, at 693-95 (discussing the blight from rising foreclosures); Kathleen C.
Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L.
REv. 355, 356-60 (2006) (discussing the problem in the context of predatory lending).
72. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 71, at 360-70; see also Cox, supra note 5, at 726-27; Creola
Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for the Rise in Foreclosures and
Abandoned Properties, 2008 UTAH L. REv. 1169, 1180-93 (2008) (noting that foreclosure law does
not provide remedies to compensate large costs borne by neighborhoods, communities, and
governments when homes are foreclosed, and discussing how three cities have handled the effects of
mortgage foreclosure).
73. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST.
115, 119 (2009) (explaining that despite many interventions to save homes, such as proposed
mortgage modification in bankruptcy, the law lacks mechanisms that take neighborhood
characteristics into account).
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IV. BEYOND FORECLOSURE: DISAGGREGATING HOME AND OWNERSHIP
Part III employed Baker's right to rent proposal to illustrate how reform
of the foreclosure process could account for a wider range of values than
those reflected in the traditional law review scholarship.74 At least on an ex
post basis, Baker's proposal directly addresses three sets of significant
housing and community questions.
Although other recent proposals also consider these kinds of questions,
the right to rent and other leaseback proposals are distinctive because they
disaggregate these values from continued ownership. Thus, for example,
Baker's idea illustrates quite well that a response to the "where will they
live" shelter question is not dependent upon continued homeownership.
Furthermore, by giving parents of school-aged children a continued
possessory interest, the proposal gives parents more control over the timing
of residential transitions and thus offers a way to prevent disrupted education
during financial distress.7 ' This could increase parents' incentives to
terminate unsustainable homeownership and redeploy their limited resources
in ways that promote the wellbeing of their children. Finally, continuing
occupation without ownership addresses some of the externalities that arise
due to abandonment of property in foreclosure without forestalling the
foreclosure of the ownership interest itself.76
The disaggregation of owner-occupation from concepts of home or
various housing objectives is controversial but important. Although some
argue that homeownership benefits communities in distinct ways,78 it is far
from clear that the level of investment required for homeownership is
appropriate or desirable for all households.79 Historian Thomas Sugrue
74. See supra Part III.
75. See supra Part III.B.
76. For other suggestions on how to reduce the community impact of foreclosure, see, for
example, Johnson, supra note 72, at 1237-53.
77. See generally Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk, supra note 42. Recently, Kristen Adams has
also suggested that certain attributes often associated with homeownership, such as independence
and wealth building, do not perfectly correlate. Kristen David Adams, Homeownership: American
Dream or Illusion of Empowerment?, 60 S.C. L. REv. 573, 596 (2009) ("[H]omeownership
sometimes brings dependence and loss of wealth rather than the expected independence and
increased wealth.").
78. For example, William Fischel argues that because homeowners have so much wealth tied up
in their homes, they actively take positions on local government issues in an effort to maximize their
household values. FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 5-6. However, Fischel acknowledges that something
must be done to combat homeowners' excessive "NIMBYism" (which stands for "not in my
backyard"). Id. at 9-11. He proposes insurance contracts to protect homeowners against declines in
asset value from undesirable uses. Id. at 269. 1 have discussed a collection of studies on the asserted
relationships between owner-occupation and community benefits in Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk,
supra note 42, at 2276-80.
79. See Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1047, 1059 (2008)(discussing the "onsite investment facet of homeownership"). Fennell notes that traditional
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recently observed that "[e]very generation has offered its own version of the
claim that owner-occupied homes are the nation's saving grace."80 The
message has been quite successful in recent years; research in the 1990s
estimated that between 80% and 90% of Americans will own a home at
some point in their lives.81 But some authors in the legal literature have
recently suggested that homeownership has been over-promoted, or that the
stated benefits of homeownership are illusory for some people.82 In addition
to the possibility that a homeowner could lose wealth, scholars raise
concerns about the mobility cost of a home that is worth less than its debt.
Scholars in other disciplines have long been expressly critical of, or at least
open to questioning, the push for homeownership. 84  Likewise, feminist
scholars have long been skeptical of the notion that men and women
experience and benefit equally from homeownership or even from the
(supposedly comforting) concept of home.
leveraged homeownership is a highly undiversified investment, leaving families quite vulnerable to
market downturns. See id at 1051; see also FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 74-75 ("The owner of a
home ... has a large fraction of her wealth tied up in the property.... Owners of homes cannot
diversify their portfolios by spreading out ownership of their asset . . . ."); Melissa B. Jacoby,
Bankruptcy Reform and Homeownership Risk, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 323, 324 ("Incurring home
mortgage debt has expanded ... opportunities, but it has also expanded ... risk-for many
individuals, the largest financial risk of their lifetimes.").
80. Thomas J. Sugrue, The New American Dream: Renting, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2009; see also
Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 53, at 955.
81. FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 80 (citing a study published in 1998 by Jim Berkovec and Peter
Zorn).
82. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 77; A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and
Why Home Ownership Is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189 (2009); Stern, supra note 53.
83. Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 53 at 972; Peter B. Meyer, Jerry Yeager & Michael A.
Burayidi, Institutional Myopia and Policy Distortions: The Promotion of Homeownership for the
Poor, 28 J. ECON. ISSUES 567, 572 (1994). The authors of this article observe that panel study of
income dynamics data "further demonstrates the inability of lower income households to predict
their mobility," id., and discuss how this has been given too little consideration in discussions of
promoting homeownership: "If low- and moderate-income households cannot predict their own
mobility, then they are clearly subject to unanticipated pressures on the capacity to sustain tenure."
Id.
84. CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING, supra note 53; LOw-INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP:
EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds. 2002); Anne B.
Shlay, Low-Income Homeownership: American Dream or Delusion?, 43 URB. STUD. 511 (2006).
85. For example, "second-wave" feminists often argued that home serves to reinforce patriarchy
and saw the home as a locus of insecurity and inequality. See Fox, CONCEPTUALISING HOME, supra
note 41, at 362-63 (reviewing literature); Fox, Re-Possessing "Home," supra note 41 at 426 ("[T]he
gender dimensions of homeowner debt, default, and the risk of losing one's home in a foreclosure or
bankruptcy present particular challenges for feminist theory, which has historically rejected the idea
that home is a positive phenomenon for women, or that the relationship between a woman and her
home is one that should be protected in law."). See also Ruth Madigan, Moira Munro & Susan J.
Smith, Gender and the Meaning of the Home, 14 INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 625, 642 (1990)
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Nonetheless, in a culture that ascribes homeownership as the "natural"
and "normal" approach,86 the rental sector has been viewed as a second-class
housing tenure, and with suspicion. In addition to the purported economic
disincentives to renting as compared to ownership, contributions in the
meaning of home literature sometimes perpetuate the view that
homeownership offers more ontological security than renting.88  Two-way
movement between ownership and renting has thus been stigmatized and
discouraged in various respects.89
Foreclosure reform proposals that reflect some of the objectives
commonly associated with owner-occupation-but are not themselves
contingent on homeownership-perform a useful function: they implicitly
challenge the assumption that homeownership and mortgage market
promotion should be the dominant concern of housing policy. They also
suggest the benefits of developing a broader range of housing tenures to
better reflect households' diversity of preferences and circumstances. 90
V. CONCLUSION
According to Avital Margalit, "Mortgage foreclosures . .. allow us to
examine the commitment of Israeli society to the value of home ownership
in particular and to housing welfare in general." 9' Indeed, if the oft-asserted
("We have argued in this section that all these meanings [of home] are gender-differentiated and that
the expansion of owner occupation ... may have enhanced these discrepancies.").
86. Fox, Re-Possessing "Home," supra note 41, at 453 ("[Government] initiatives have played
an important role in establishing homeownership as the 'normal' tenure, and in linking the
economic, social, and cultural meanings of 'home' with homeownership [and t]his has important
implications in relation to the meanings of home for women .... ); Jim Kemeny, A Critique of
Homeownership, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING, supra note 53, at 272-73 (discussing
"mystical reverence" for ownership and a supposedly natural desire to own a home).
87. See Adams, supra note 77, at 595-96 ("Americans have stigmatized renting and renters. I
suggest that stigmatizing renters and over-privileging homeowners is unfounded."); Veness, supra
note 53, at 453-54 (recounting history of suspicion and perceived personal deficiency of renters in
early 20th century that led to "unwillingness of some leaders to incorporate tenancy as a viable
permanent housing alternative for many segments of US society"). This perception is not limited to
the United States; renting in other countries is sometimes described as "a stream of 'dead' money,"
or "throwing money down the drain." Ann Dupuis & David C. Thorns, Home, Home Ownership
and the Search for Ontological Security, 46 SoC. REv. 24, 32 (1998) (discussing New Zealand);
Madigan et al., supra note 85, at 633 (describing generally how renting and owning are perceived).
88. For a recent review of the literature on this point, see, for example, Ade Kearns et al.,
'Beyond Four Walls'. The Psycho-Social Benefits of Home: Evidence from West Central Scotland,
15 HOUSING STuD. 387, 390, 406 (2000) (discussing articles, including some from the United States,
that suggest that renting is "a tenure of insecurity and vulnerability" but find "no great divide" along
housing tenure lines between owners and renters in this respect" based on original research presented
in article). See generally Shelley Mallett, Understanding Home: A Critical Review of the Literature,
52 Soc. REV. 62 (2004) (discussing disciplinary contributions to the meaning of home literature).
89. Kemeny, supra note 86, at 273.
90. See Fennell, supra note 79, at 1049-50.
91. Margalit, supra note 51, at 469.
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values of housing policy are not reflected in foreclosure law, it is legitimate
to question the seriousness with which the government pursues those
policies.
The traditional foreclosure law scholarship identified potential defects in
the mechanics of the foreclosure process that undermined fairness or
efficiency, but did not hold foreclosure law accountable to the yardstick of
some very basic objectives of a rational housing policy. Whether or not one
would want to enact a right to rent on a temporary or permanent basis, this
idea at least directly deals with more of those questions.
At the same time, the right to rent concept demonstrates that honoring
the values that undergird the public interest in private housing need not be
equated to ownership per se. To a larger extent than often realized, the
justifications for homeownership promotion can and should be
disaggregated from a specific housing tenure.
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